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Non-Technical Abstract
The paper reviews the familiar arguments for and against
monetary union among the members of the European union.  Many of
the arguments on both sides are found to be flawed.  Implications are
drawn for monetary and fiscal policy design in the transition to
monetary union and following it.
Microeconomic efficiency arguments argue for a common
currency (as they do for the adoption of a common language), provided
the switching costs are not too high.  In order to minimize the switching
costs, rather than adopting a new and unfamiliar label, the name of the
most widely used existing currency (that is, the D-mark) should be
attached to the new common numéraire.
Differences in national needs for recourse to seigniorage (or the
inflation tax) do not provide a strong theoretical rationale for the
retention of national monetary sovereignty. In addition, the
(anticipated) inflation tax has been a very minor source of government
revenue outside Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy and
Spain.  For countries with a very high public debt and limited fiscal
credibility, such as Italy, Greece and Belgium, giving up the ability to
amortize part of this debt through a bout of unanticipated inflation may
be rather more costly.
It is nominal rigidities in national wage and price setting
mechanisms that provide the rationale for nominal exchange rate
flexibility as a desirable shock absorber for asymmetric demand shocks
originating in the goods markets.  These same nominal rigidities also
provide the rational against nominal exchange rate flexibility in the face
of asymmetric demand shocks originating in the financial markets.
As these nominal rigidities are transient (money is neutral in the
long run), policy instruments or changes in institutional arrangements
that would compensate for the loss of national monetary sovereignty
only need have transitory or temporary effects.
The inter-state redistribution that takes place in the US through
both sides of the Federal Budget, also provides insurance against
permanent differential shocks to state output.  As state-level exchange
rate flexibility could never provide the same insurance, the absence of
large scale permanent redistribution mechanisms between EU members
need not be an obstacle to successful monetary union among them.  A
redistribution mechanism among EU members that would fully
compensate for the loss of exchange rate flexibility need only be
capable of making temporary or transitory transfers.
Since nominal exchange rate flexibility can, at best, provide the
means of fine-tuning the response to asymmetric shocks, international
labour migration is unlikely to ever provide an effective substitute for
it.  The kind of labour mobility that would mimic the workings of a
flexible nominal exchange rate would be strictly temporary (that is,
reversible) migration.  Even the US does not have this high a degree of
inter-state labour mobility, so if the US is an optimal currency area, it
is so despite the absence of the requisite degree of labour mobility.
Divergent real economic structures, behaviour and developments
are irrelevant from the point of view of the desirability of monetary
union.  Monetary policy simply does not have the ability to influence
long-term real developments (productivity growth, real wage rigidities,
non-wage labour costs, demographic strains on the budget) that matter.
With unrestricted international mobility of financial capital, a
common currency becomes, at the very least, extremely desirable and
in all likelihood, unavoidable.  Fixed or fixed but flexible exchange
rate regimes that fall short of a common currency are prone to collapse
either for opportunistic reasons or because of irresistible speculative
attacks.  Floating exchange rates exhibit both excess short-term
volatility and persistent medium-term misalignment.  Re-imposing
capital controls does not appear to be a feasible option.
Following the positive vetting of Ireland, the Maastricht
convergence criteria appear to be applied sufficiently flexibly and
sensibly not to be an obstacle to monetary union among a majority of
current EU members.  The one exception are those high public debt
members which also suffer from at least the perception (and quite likely
the reality) of not being able to generate the required primary (non-
interest) government surpluses in the future.  Greece, Italy and Belgium
come to mind.  For these countries, the inability (according to the
Maastricht exchange rate criterion) of having one last maxi-devaluation
before they throw the exchange rate key away by joining EMU may be
quite costly.  The recent Commission proposal to have a one-year delay
between the announcement of the decision on who will join EMU and
the irrevocable fixing of the parities is a recipe for speculative disaster.
There appear to be no convincing economic arguments left against
monetary union among all but a few of the current EU members.   
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1.  Introduction
The title of this paper is intentionally cautious about the
likelihood of monetary union in Western Europe:   it refers rather non-
commitally to `a' monetary union in the abstract rather than to `the'
monetary union that many hope or fear will occur as the culmination
of the process set in motion by the Maastricht Treaty.  Whether or not
monetary union among the EU members will extend beyond the
extraordinarily durable arrangement that has united Belgium and
Luxembourg in a currency union since 1922, will be decided, as most
European monetary matters seem to be these days, in Frankfurt and
Berlin.  
This paper is an analytical, but largely non-technical exploration
of the considerations that should guide the design of monetary and
fiscal policy by a group of nations considering monetary union.  Much
of the paper is a review of the pros and cons of monetary union.  The
reason for this focus is that, once it is clear what is actually given up by
a nation (or group of nations) that relinquishes monetary sovereignty,
it is quite straightforward to determine what changes are required, in
the fiscal policy instrumentarium and/or in other aspects of the capacity
to adjust, in order that she may compensate for the loss of the national
monetary instrument(s).  What follows is therefore essentially a review
of the theory of optimal currency areas, one of the murkiest and most
unsatisfactory areas of macroeconomic and monetary theory.  
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2
reviews microeconomic arguments for a common currency.  Section 3
reviews neoclassical public finance arguments against a common
currency.  Section 4 considers the implications of nominal rigidities.
Section 5 looks at what kinds of additions to the policy arsenal or
institutional capacity for adjustment to shocks are required to make up
for the loss of the exchange rate instrument.  Section 6 reviews the role
of capital controls and Section 7 the Maastricht convergence criteria.
22.  Microeconomic Efficiency Arguments for a Common Currency
The microeconomic efficiency arguments for a common currency
are well-known and don't require rehashing at length.  A medium of
exchange or transactions medium is subject to an obvious network
externality (see eg Dowd and Greenaway [1993]).  This is most easily
seen in the case of intrinsically valueless (or fiat) money:  the
usefulness to me of a medium of exchange (and therefore the likelihood
of me accepting it in exchange for intrinsically valued goods and
services) is increasing in the number of other people that are likely to
accept it as a medium of exchange, since this is what determines the
liquidity or moneyness of the medium of exchange: probability of me
being able to dispose of it whenever I want to, at short notice, and at
little cost.
The public good properties of money should be characterized
carefully.  The public good issue relates to the private and social utility
derived from the choice of one particular currency (or set of currencies)
rather than another, as numéraire, medium of exchange and means of
payment.  This issue is quite distinct from that of how the utility
enjoyed by an individual agent varies with the quantity of a particular
currency used or held by that agent, holding constant the pattern of
currency use by all other agents.  The use of a given stock of money
balances in transactions is obviously rival:  I can only spend a given
dollar bill once.  However, since the usefulness to me of any particular
currency rather than another for effecting transactions (the
"moneyness" of any given currency) is strictly increasing in the
frequency, scale and scope of that currency's use by others, there is an
ultra-non-rivalness in the choice of which currency to use.  This
creates the public goods aspects of money.1
Social transactions costs are minimized with a single currency.
There is a direct parallel here with the social gains from having a
common language.  Apart from aesthetic considerations, the value to
me of learning another language is increasing in the number of other
people that know the language.  For communication purposes (as
opposed to hobbyism), a common world language would clearly be
3optimal, if like the Creator, we could redesign the universe from
scratch.
De Cecchini Report tried to estimate the real resource savings
from the bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange markets.  This, the
value added in the foreign exchange business, represents the
competitive rentals of the physical and human resources currently tied
up in the exchange of currencies that would become redundant (or
liberated) by monetary union, plus any pure rents, enjoyed either as
monopoly profits or as X-inefficiency (organizational slack).  
To the extent that these markets are imperfectly competitive, the
equilibrium spreads overstate the opportunity social costs incurred by
banks and other foreign exchange traders of exchanging one currency
for another.
On the other hand, the spread ignores altogether the real resource
costs incurred by the other (non-bank) parties in the foreign exchange
markets, called in-house costs in Emerson et al [1990].   It seems fair
to say that no-one has a clue as to the true magnitude of the
microeconomic efficiency gains that might be achieved by monetary
union, in the EU or elsewhere.
While, if once could re-design the world from scratch,
microeconomic efficiency would clearly suggest the optimality of a
single common currency, it does not follow that it is necessarily
efficient (from a microeconomic point of view) to move to a common
currency from an initial situation involving many currencies.  Switching
currencies (not exchanging currencies, but beginning to use a different
currency as numéraire and medium of exchange) is costly because, in
a world of boundedly rational agents with limited computational, data-
gathering and data-processing capacity, "we must learn to reckon in the
new currency, we must change the units in which we quote prices, we
might have to change our record, and so on."  (Dowd and Greenaway
[1993, p.1180]).  In addition, there are the real resource costs of
introducing a new currency (or of extending the use of an existing
currency to previous non-users), the costs of converting contracts
denominated in old currencies into the new currency (which will
4provide great opportunities for rent-seeking by the legal profession) and
a variety of other costs that can be labelled "vending machine costs".
The one-off cost of switching must be set against the continuing gains
from operating with a single currency.
The existence of switching costs means that the microeconomic
case for moving to a common currency from a pre-existing multiple
currency system is not a priori self-evident, although there can be little
doubt that, unless one has an excessively high discount rate, there is a
microeconomic case for moving to a common currency.  
An interesting point, noted in Dowd and Greenaway [1993], is
that a move to a single currency should be a move towards the
universal use of one of the pre-existing currencies (say the D-mark in
the EU) rather than the adoption of a new currency (such as the ECU).2
That way at least the Germans will be spared the switching costs, and
even non-Germans will be dealing with a common currency that will
at least be somewhat familiar.  By the same token, English, Spanish or
Mandarin would make a better world language than Esperanto.  Note
that it is only the name and other pheno-typical superficialities like the
appearance of notes and coins that need be adopted universally in
order to minimize switching costs.  The Bundesbank and the remainder
of the current institutional framework determining German monetary
policy can (and should) be replaced by the new European institutions
envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.  This suggests the following
proposition.  
Proposition I
If the European Union (or a subset thereof) moves to a
common currency, efficiency considerations suggest that
the name of the most widely used existing currency be
attached to the new common numéraire.  This means that
the name of the new European currency should be the D-
mark.
5Nothing in the Maastricht Treaty precludes the adoption of the D-
mark as the name of the common currency.  Note again that while the
name `D-mark' would be retained, the Bundesbank would, as provided
in the Maastricht Treaty, lose its ability to conduct monetary policy in
Germany or anywhere, and would become just the German branch
office of the ECB.  It would be the ECB that controlled the issuance
of D-marks following monetary union.
Leaving aside the microeconomic efficiency arguments for a
common currency, there are just two fundamental reasons why the
nominal exchange rate regime might matter for real economic
performance.  These are the same reasons why money matters in open
or closed economies:  seigniorage and nominal inertia.  We consider
these in turn in the next two sections.  Note that, once we abstract from
the microeconomic efficiency arguments, the arguments for a common
currency (or monetary union) are the same as those for any credible
fixed exchange rate regime.  It may of course be the case that the only
truly credible fixed exchange rate regime is a common currency.  For
most of the arguments that follow, however, the key issue is whether
the peg is fixed and is believed to remain fixed now and in the future.
3.  Exchange Rate Independence, Seigniorage, the Inflation Tax
and the Neoclassical Theory of Public Finance
Governments can appropriate real resource by issuing intrinsically
valueless (fiat) money, provided private agents believe that fiat money
will offer them a competitive rate of return (including saved
transactions costs) over the planned holding period.  A government can
raise the attractiveness to private agents of its fiat money by paying
interest on it, by declaring it legal tender, by requiring certain
transactions (say tax payments) to be made with it and by making the
use of other transactions media costly or even illegal.  Since the private
(and social) marginal cost of producing fiat money is (approximately
zero) the government must have some monopoly power over its
issuance if it is going to gain command over real resources by varying
its quantity.  
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Let the nominal quantity of government fiat money (henceforth
base money) outstanding at the beginning of period t be denoted Ht.
For simplicity, assume that base money (currency plus banks' balances
with the central bank) is non-interest-bearing.  Let Pt be the general
price level during period t and Yt real GDP.  ?  is the backward
difference operator.
While the terms "seigniorage" and "inflation tax" are often used
interchangeably, there is many a slip between the cup and the lip in
going from the one to the other.  By seigniorage I mean the resources
appropriated by the government by expanding the nominal monetary
base.  As a fraction of GDP, it is given by s t in equation (1):
There is a closely related concept, occasionally also referred to
in the literature as seigniorage (although I shall avoid that usage), given
in equation (2), which defines the interest burden foregone by the
government through its ability to issue non-interest-bearing liabilities.
Let i t+1 denote the one-period nominal interest rate on government
interest-bearing debt issued in period t.  This concept of interest
burden foregone, denoted ? t, is given (as a fraction of GDP) in
equation (2) 
The flows of current and future seigniorage and the flows of
current and future interest burden foregone are related by the following
identity:
7or, equivalently, letting ht /Ht /(PtYt) denote the monetary base-GDP
ratio, pt+1 / (Pt+1/Pt))-1, the rate of inflation and gt+1/(Yt+1/Yt)-1 the
growth rate of real GDP,
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Thus, the present discounted value of current and future
seigniorage equals the present discounted value of the current and
future interest burden foregone (the operating profits of the central
bank), minus the initial stock of base money (the liabilities of the
central bank).  The two sides of the equation therefore offer different
ways of looking at the net worth of the central bank.
A third related concept, also at times referred to as seigniorage,
is the Central Bank's budgetary contribution to the general government.
This is effectively the tax levied by the Treasury on the Central Bank.
It could, in principle, be anything, up to the maximal feasible resource
transfer of the Central Bank to the Treasury, that is the Central Bank's
net worth defined in equation (3).  
The inflation tax is generally defined as the reduction in the real
value of the outstanding stock of base money due to increases in the
general price level.  Thus, the inflation tax in period t, as a fraction of
GDP, t pt, is given by3
The inflation tax and seigniorage are related by the identity given
in (6):
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In the special case where base money velocity is constant and
inflation expectations are realized, equation (6) simplifies to 
Seigniorage exceeds the inflation tax to the extent that there is
positive real growth.
If there exists a stable base money demand function and if we are
able to predict the arguments in the base money demand function for
the period of interest, we can provide a map between the seigniorage
revenue extracted by the government and the rate of inflation.  I
illustrate with a simple small open economy with an ad hoc money
demand function.  Let ht be a negative function of the domestic short
nominal interest i (representing the domestic financial margin of
substitution between non-interest-bearing currency and short interest-
bearing debt) and the expected rate of depreciation of the currency ee
(representing the direct international currency substitution margin).
The domestic nominal interest is the domestic real interest  rate
plus the expected rate of inflation, pe , that is,
If ? is the proportional rate of depreciation of the real exchange
rate and p* the foreign rate of inflation, then
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If we can project the real exchange rate, the foreign rate of
inflation and the domestic real interest rate, then the monetary base-
GDP ratio is uniquely (and negatively) related to the domestic expected
rate of inflation.  This still does not suffice to give us the amount of
seigniorage the government can extract, however.  From the definitions
of s  and h it follows that, in general, we have to project future base
money velocity as well as current velocity in order to get from our base
money demand function to a predicted value for the government's
seigniorage4.  Consider a steady state, with a, r, g and p* constant and
exogenous, ?=0, pe=p and ee =e.  Seigniorage as a function of the rate
of inflation exhibits the familiar seigniorage Laffer curve given in
equation (11)
with
When the demand for money is sensitive to the (expected) rate of
inflation, the inflation tax is distortionary, like every other real-world
tax, transfer or subsidy.  The normative neoclassical theory of public
finance recognizes that, in general, a (constrained) optimal design of
fiscal policy will require the use of all distortionary tax instruments.
Efficiency requires that the excess burdens imposed by the various
distortionary taxes be equalized at the margin.  This might seem to
11
create a presumption that countries with well-developed direct and
indirect tax systems therefore could be expected to make less use of the
inflation tax than countries with less efficient revenue administrations
and more relaxed public attitudes towards tax evasion.  The
(constrained) optimal inflation rates (from the perspective of the
neoclassical theory of public finance) might be expected to vary across
time and across countries as tax bases, tax administration and tax ethics
vary.  
Even this presumption is less robust than one might assume,
however.  Recent insights into the optimal use of distortionary taxes on
the returns from durable (capital) assets, due to Chamley [1986] (see
also Lucas [1990], Zhu [1992] and Roubini and Milesi-Ferretti [1994])
imply that, at least in the fairly standard model developed below, the
Friedman rule for the optimal quantity of money (the nominal rate of
interest should be zero and satiation with real money balances should
occur) still applies despite the fact that there are no non-distortionary
tax instruments available for financing public expenditure.  The optimal
seigniorage argument for differential national inflation rates therefore
needs to be qualified, even as a purely theoretical proposition.
3.1.  A simple model of optimal seigniorage
The neoclassical public finance argument for nationally
differentiated inflation rates can be made precise with the help of a
simple formal model.  The standard formulation of the optimal
seigniorage argument is for a deterministic closed economy setting.
Since the key theoretical points can all be addressed in this simplest
format, I will follow precedent in the brief exposition that follows.
A representative infinite-lived competitive consumer maximizes
the objective functional given in equation (13), defined over
consumption of marketed goods, c, real money balances, h, and work
effort, R, subject to his sequential budget identity (14), non-negativity
constraints on consumption and money holdings and the solvency
constraint given in (15)
12
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where (with a slight change in notation) ht+j / Ht+j /Pt+j .  The felicity
function u is increasing in consumption and  decreasing in labour; it is
increasing in h for and constant in h for .  is theh < h¯ > 0 h $ h¯ h¯
satiation level of real money balances, which may be infinite.  u is
concave, twice continuously differentiable its third argument, strictly
concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada
conditions; d>0 is the pure rate of time preference.
b is the stock of one-period maturity, index-linked safe
government debt and t  the proportional tax rate on labour income.
Production uses labour only.  One unit of labour produces one unit of
perishable (non-storable) output.  The monetary base and the safe one-
period index-linked bond are the only stores of value.
The first-order conditions of the household optimization problem
are given in (16) through (18)5:
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The household single-period budget identity can be rewritten as
in equation (19)
The government spends an exogenous amount Gt in period t on
real resources (which can be viewed as government consumption that
enters separably into the private felicity function) and finances this
expenditure with the distortionary tax on labour income, by printing
money or by borrowing.  Its single-period budget identity is given in
equation (20) and its solvency constraint in equation (21).  Some
exogenous fraction (1-?t) of the tax revenues it raises is lost (to the
government and to society).  The parameter ? can be thought of as an
index of the efficiency of the country's tax administration, 0#?<1.  It
is quite likely that 1-? is increasing in the tax rate t , but for reasons of
space we shall not pursue this here.
14
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Note that (14) and (20) imply that 
A benevolent government capable of credible precommitment,
will choose the distortionary tax rates t t and its interest-bearing debt for
the next period, bt+1 so as to maximize the utility of the representative
individual given in (13), subject to equations (14) through (18) and
(20) to (21).   For the special case without uncertainty and separable
l o g a r i t h m i c  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  f e l i c i t y ,
, equations (16) to (18)u(t) ' lnct % a1lnht & a2lnRt a1,a2$0
simplify to
An optimizing government that maximizes the same objective
functional as the representative household, by choosing infinite
sequences of its labour income tax rate and its borrowing (and
therefore, given the exogenously given sequence of public spending,
also of its monetary financing) will find that its optimal programme is
characterized by the condition that   This means that1
1%d
j a1
ht%j
' 0.
the familiar Chicago rule for the optimal quantity of money applies
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despite the distortionary character of the tax on labour:  the nominal
interest rate is zero in each period and that the equilibrium therefore
supports the satiation level of real money balances.  This result also
holds for the more general utility function of equation (13):
If the exogenous variables are constant, there exists a stationary
solution in which minus the inflation rate equals the interest rate which
equals the pure rate of time preference
Note specifically, that the optimal inflation rate is independent of
the parameters governing labour supply (which determine the excess
burden associated with financing public spending by using the labour
income tax) and of the value of ?, which measures the efficiency of the
tax administration, collection and enforcement system.  Only
differences in national time preference rates would result in differences
in optimal national inflation rates.
By analogy with the results obtained by Chamley [1986], the
durable asset is not taxed in the long-run (in steady state).   The
durable asset in our model is not taxed in the short-run either.  This is
because in our model the durable asset is money, which is unlike the
physical capital that constitutes the durable asset in Chamley's model
in two respects.  First, real money balances, unlike physical capital,
enter into the direct utility function and second, a capital levy on real
money balances (through a jump in the price level) reduces the real
stock of money balances, unlike a capital levy on the owners of
physical capital, which leaves the physical capital intact as a productive
resource.6  A capital levy on real money balances therefore cannot be
part of an optimal programme.
17
The result that the optimal policy is characterized by a zero
nominal rate of interest is not robust to modifications of the model that
result in the elimination of the tax instrument (the wage income tax),
that does not involve an intertemporal distortion.  If for instance,
labour income were the return on human capital, an augmentable
input, rather than the return on an input (time spent working) that is
endogenous at a point in time but cannot be augmented over time
through investment activities, the optimal tax programme would not be
characterized by money balance satiation.  Nevertheless, the little
optimizing model of this sub-section suffices to make the case for
attaching a health warning to conclusions about optimal seigniorage
derived from the usual ad hoc models (see eg Barro [1988] and
Mankiw [1987]).
Few people are likely to lie awake about seigniorage for most
EMU countries in any case.  As is clear from Table 1, in recent years,
there has been very little recourse to the anticipated inflation tax or to
seigniorage for most EMU countries, with the notable exceptions of
Spain, Italy and especially Greece and Portugal (see also Grilli
[1989a,b]).  Few people are likely to lie awake about this for most
EMU countries.   It seems extremely unlikely that the imposition of a
common (low) rate of inflation on the EMU countries would
significantly increase the excess burden associated with the financing
of the public spending programme.
 
3.2.  A broader view of the inflation tax
Countries that are members of a common currency area are
constrained to have a common equilibrium rate of inflation of traded
goods prices.  Non-traded goods inflation rates will differ, in
equilibrium, by the difference between the national productivity growth
differentials among traded and non-traded goods.  Nationally
differentiated inflation tax rates therefore disappear as a revenue-raising
fiscal instrument.
The inflation tax of the previous sub-section is perhaps more
accurately referred to as the (narrowly defined) anticipated inflation
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tax.  Even then, anticipated inflation can influence the government's
budgetary position through other channels.  The most important of
these is the Olivera-Tanzi effect through which a higher rate of inflation
erodes the real value of taxes paid in arrears.  The reason is that such
arrears neither tend to be index-linked nor have a market interest rate
reflecting anticipated inflation attached to them.  
In addition to using the anticipated inflation tax (broadly defined
to include the Olivera-Tanzi effect and similar phenomena), the
government can improve its real financial net worth by reducing the
real value of its outstanding nominally-denominated fixed interest rate
debt through unanticipated inflation.  The effect of an unexpected
increase in the current and/or future rate of inflation on the market
value of the domestic-currency-denominated non-indexed fixed-rate
debt increases with the remaining term to maturity of the debt7.
Variable interest rate, short maturity debt can have its real value
eroded by an unanticipated increase in the price level.  Even if nominal
domestic costs are sticky, the CPI will be flexible in an open economy
through the import component of the consumption bundle.  In a small
open economy, a price level jump can be engineered through a discrete
(or maxi-) devaluation.  
Giving up the ability to have nationally differentiated
unanticipated inflation tax levies on the national debt, may be more
serious than the loss of the discretionary use of the anticipated inflation
tax for a number of countries with high public debt GDP ratios and a
doubtful capacity for generating significant and sustained primary
surpluses.  For this group of countries, which includes Greece, Italy
and Belgium, the need for a de jure (through a (partial) "consolidation"
or default by some other name) or de facto (through an inflation
surprise or an unexpected devaluation) capital levy on the public debt
may well become irresistible.  If a de jure public debt repudiation turns
out to be politically unacceptable, a fierce burst of monetary and
exchange rate irresponsibility may be the only way to re-impose ex-
post consistency on the public accounts.  The optimal time to do this,
would be just before joining EMU, as in that case there would be no
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cost (in terms of the credibility of the country's commitment to future
non-inflationary policies) from having a last fling with inflation.
Unfortunately, the exchange rate, inflation and interest rate criteria of
the Maastricht Treaty would seem to rule out such a desirable public
debt `end-game'.
As the EU is only a relatively small subset of the set of all
nations, there is an additional international seigniorage dimension.
Member currencies (especially the D-mark) are used as reserves,
intervention currencies and vehicle currencies by official and private
agents outside the EU.  The total amount of external seigniorage raised
by all EU members from non-EU members is likely to change as a
result of monetary union.  It is quite possible that a new European
currency could become, in relatively short order, a more effective
competitor for the US dollar as an international store of value than the
DM is today8.  This good news must, however, be balanced by the
recognition that the rules that will be followed by the European
Central Bank for the distribution of its seigniorage (including its
external seigniorage) among the various member states is unlikely to
mimic the current distribution of seigniorage.  Scope for conflict is
clearly present.
4.  Nominal Rigidities and the Keynesian Arguments for an
Optimal Currency Area
The monetary non-neutralities I wish to focus on in this section
are short-run `Keynesian' non-neutralities, due to various nominal
rigidities in wage and/or price setting behaviour.  They are to be
distinguished from the non-neutralities that would be present even in
a world without nominal rigidities and that reflect the effects of
anticipated inflation on consumption demand and portfolio allocation,
such as the Mundell-Tobin effect.
"Superneutrality" of money, that is, invariance of real equilibrium
allocations in classical competitive equilibrium models with complete
markets, under alternative fully anticipated rates of growth of the
nominal money stock and associated rates of inflation, makes for fun
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theory but is unlikely to be of much practical interest.  The Mundell-
Tobin effect is probably the best-known channel through which higher
anticipated inflation, by affecting the portfolio choice between money
and real capital, influences real equilibrium allocations.  It will be
ignored in what follows.
Nominal wage and price rigidities are the result of the common
empirical practice of setting wages and prices in money terms for
several periods in advance.  These multi-period nominal contracts are
incomplete.  In particular, they are often not contingent on nominal
wage and price developments elsewhere in the economy or in the
economy as a whole:  they are not index-linked.  We don't have good
theories to explain this particular form of incomplete contracting.
Indeed, we don't have good theories as to why wage and price contracts
tend to use money (the medium of exchange and means of payment) as
the numéraire (unit of account) rather than, say, bananas.  There is no
"unbounded rationality" theory explaining why the numéraire and the
means of payment tend to be the same object or class of objects.
"Menu costs" theory begs the question.  First, it does not explain why
the prices on the menu are expressed in the means of payment9 (use
money as the numéraire).  Second, it does not explain why there are
real costs associated with quoting different prices in terms of the
numéraire (whatever that happens to be).  
In the absence of a satisfactory theory of nominal rigidities, two
courses of action are open to the policy-oriented economist.  The first
is to say:  "if I cannot come up with a satisfactory set of micro-
foundations for the phenomenon, it really cannot exist.  I therefore will
proceed as if there is no nominal inertia".  This is the approach of the
new classical macroeconomics (and a fortiori of its real business cycle
offspring).  It represents a dangerous form of intellectual hubris.  The
second approach is slightly more modest.  It recognizes the absence of
satisfactory microfoundations for nominal inertia but proceeds to try
and capture the key empirical regularities in simple quasi-reduced form
behavioral relationships (such as the Phillips curve).  It then proceeds
to keep its fingers firmly crossed by hoping that the observed empirical
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regularities will be robust to the Lucas critique.  That is, it assumes that
these empirical regularities are invariant under the class of policy
regime changes and/or changes in the external economic environment
under consideration.  The proof of this pudding will be in the eating.
Incomplete indexation also accounts for the redistributions of
income and wealth often associated with unanticipated changes in the
rate of inflation.  For instance, an unanticipated increase in the rate of
inflation will redistribute real resources from creditors to debtors,
whenever debt contracts are incompletely indexed.  If creditors are
capitalists (savers) and debtors are entrepreneurs (who take the
physical investment decisions) unanticipated reductions in the rate of
inflation may, because of asymmetric information, default risk and
limited liability, lead to a process of "debt deflation" that can, for a
while, severely depress real economic activity.   
I will cast my arguments about nominal inertia in terms of the
simplest open-economy expectations-augmented Phillips curve, but
many other formalizations are possible (see eg Buiter [1985] and Buiter
and Miller [1985]).  The first issue that must be settled is whether there
is any long-run (steady-state) effect of monetary policy on such real
variables as the level of capacity utilization or the rate of
unemployment.  In the Phillips-curve paradigm, long-run non-
neutrality of inflation requires at least one of two phenomena to be
present:  either the long-run Phillips curve is non-vertical or there is
hysteresis in the natural rate of unemployment.  
4.1.  The long-run neutrality and superneutrality of money
The argument is no doubt familiar, so I will only restate it briefly
in the simplest possible setting.  The actual unemployment rate is
denoted u and the natural rate of unemployment uN.  The core inflation
rate or underlying rate of inflation is denoted    The coefficient ßpˆ.
measures the weight of foreign prices in the domestic price index.  Et-1
is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t-1, and
z denotes some exogenous process driving the natural rate of
unemployment.  Specifically, z is a process independent of past,
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current and anticipated future values of the rate of inflation, the growth
rate of nominal money or the actual unemployment rate.
In a long-run steady state, expectations are realized
( ), the inflation rate is constant and the terms of trade (orEt&1pt ' pt
real exchange rate) are constant ( ).  Consider first thept ' et % p
(
t
case where the natural rate is exogenous, that is, d=0.  In that case,
There in no long-run inflation-unemployment trade-off if and
only if ?=1, that is, core inflation feeds one-for-one into actual inflation
and the long-run Phillips curve is vertical at the exogenous natural rate
of unemployment.
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Now maintain the vertical long-run Phillips curve, that is, ?=1,
but allow path-dependence or hysteresis in the natural rate by assuming
d>0.  The current natural rate now depends (with exponentially
declining weights) on the entire past history of the actual
unemployment rate (and, of course, on the entire past history of the
exogenous process z).  While in steady state the Phillips curve is
vertical, it can be vertical at any level of unemployment, depending on
the past history of the actual unemployment rate.  With hysteresis, any
temporary shock, including a temporary nominal shock, can have
permanent, irreversible real effects.  
The assumption ?<1 ceased to be intellectually respectable quite
a while ago.  The hysteresis hypothesis is intriguing but as yet
unsubstantiated.  I will therefore, in what follows, work on the
assumption that neither the non-vertical long-run Phillips curve nor the
hysteresis hypothesis are empirically relevant to the EU.  This implies
that any monetary non-neutralities are strictly short-run only.  This has
important implications for what exchange rate flexibility (or more
generally exchange rate management) can achieve, and particularly for
its ability to influence the real exchange rate and other aspects of real
economic performance (such as output, employment and capital
formation).  It also has important implications for what a country
actually gives up when it inexorably fixes the external value of its
currency and thus for what it would have to gain or recoup in other
dimensions of policy or in the degree of flexibility of market and non-
market institutions, in order to restore the capacity to respond to
internal and external shocks that it had before it gave up national
monetary policy.
 
4.2.  Short-run non-neutrality of money and the implications of
nominal exchange rate flexibility for real economic performance
With money non-neutral in the short-run but neutral in the long-
run (?=1 and d=0 in terms of the model of equations (28) to (30)), both
the costs and benefits from nominal exchange rate flexibility are strictly
limited and transitory.
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The central messages of this sub-section are conveniently
expressed as a number of propositions.
Proposition II:   (The good news about nominal exchange rate
flexibility in the presence of nominal price or cost rigidities)
Nominal exchange rate flexibility permits international
relative price and cost adjustments that are warranted by
fundamental real developments and fundamental real
shocks --  adjustments that will eventually occur
regardless of the nature of the nominal exchange rate
regime -- to be achieved more quickly and at smaller
transitional or adjustment costs.
Proposition III:   (The bad news about nominal exchange rate
flexibility in the presence of nominal price or cost rigidities)
Nominal exchange rate flexibility will cause financial
shocks and other nominal shocks to result in temporary
changes in international relative prices and costs --
changes that are unnecessary and harmful from the point
of view of the underlying real fundamentals and that
involve real, albeit transitory, adjustment costs.
Proposition IV:   (The very bad news about nominal exchange rate
flexibility in the presence of nominal price or cost rigidities)
In a world with incomplete markets, the existence of
multiple currencies with (potentially) flexible exchange
rates creates additional financial markets through which
extrinsic (sunspot) noise and noise traders can inject
additional extrinsic, non-fundamental volatility into the
financial system and thus into the economic system as a
whole.  Exchange rate flexibility may breed excess
volatility and temporary (but possibly persistent)
misalignment rather than merely filtering an exogenously
given amount of irreducible, fundamental uncertainty.
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4.3.  Asymmetric shocks
The optimal currency area literature (see eg Mundell [1961],
McKinnon [1963], Kenen [1969], Ingram [1969, 1973],  Ishiyama
[1975], Melitz [1991], De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke [1991], Masson
and Taylor [1992], Krugman [1992, 1993], Dehesa and Krugman
[1993], Eichengreen [1990a,b] Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1992],
Bayoumi and Thomas [1995], Bini-Smaghi and Vori [1993],
Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993], Leeftinck [1994], Bayoumi [1995],
von Hagen and Hammond [1995] and Muet [1995]) has emphasized
that if the preponderance of shocks hitting a potential common
currency area are idiosyncratic or asymmetric, that is, region-specific
or nation-specific shocks, then the case for a common currency is
weakened.  Much of this literature has not been sufficiently diligent in
pointing out that nominal rigidities are a necessary condition for this
conclusion to follow.  Without nominal rigidities, the exchange rate
regime is, give or take the optimal inflation tax, a matter of indifference.
You have to be a Keynesian (at least for the short run) if you are to get
legitimately exercised about the exchange rate regime.
Two further characteristics of a country's economic structure have
been argued to be important for the choice of exchange rate regime.
These are the openness of the country to trade in goods and services
and the degree of diversification of its production structure.  As
regards openness to trade, the argument is that, if imports and exports
(or more generally importables and exportables) are large relative to
domestic absorption, respectively production, then variations in the
nominal exchange rate will tend to be translated swiftly and
comprehensively into increases in domestic consumer and producer
prices, without any changes in key indices of international
competitiveness.  The limiting case would be that of the small open
economy with only traded goods.   Note, however, that even in this
case nominal wage rigidity would result in (short-run) changes in real
wages and real unit labour costs resulting from variations in the
nominal exchange rate, thus influencing an important dimension of
26
international competitiveness, even without any changes in the relative
prices of different traded goods.10  
As regards diversification of the production structure, this is best
viewed as a determinant of the likelihood that shocks to the demand for
or supply of goods and services are symmetric (general) or asymmetric
(nation-specific).  If goods demand or supply shocks are more
symmetric, fewer and smaller international relative price or cost
adjustments are required and nominal exchange rate flexibility is less
valuable.  Eg if two nations have well-diversified production structures,
an industry-specific supply shock is more likely to affect both countries
in a similar manner.  Similarly, if their demands are well-diversified,
shocks to demand (say fiscal policy shocks) are likely to impact more
symmetrically on the domestic and foreign economies.
Even having granted nominal rigidities their central place in the
argument, the presumption that asymmetric shocks favour independent
currencies and floating exchange rates is seriously misleading.
Consider, for concreteness, the basic semi-small11 open economy model
with perfect international capital mobility, presented in equations (32)
to (38) below.  All variables are in natural logarithms with the
exception of nominal and real interest rates.  Foreign variables and
parameters are distinguished by a star superscript.  All parameters are
positive.  m is the nominal money stock, p the price level, e the
nominal spot exchange rate (the domestic currency price of foreign
exchange), y real output, c the real exchange rate, d the stock of
domestic credit and ? the stock of international reserves.  The money
demand shock, the IS shock and the supply shock are denoted
and  respectively.eR, ed es,
Assume for concreteness that the objective is policy is to stabilize
real output around its `full information', natural level 12 Basicallyest.
(and at the risk of only slight simplification), nominal exchange rate
flexibility is desirable when faced with "IS" shocks (shocks to the
private or public demand for goods and services).  Nominal exchange
rate flexibility is definitely undesirable in the face of domestic financial
market shocks (say liquidity preference (money demand) or shocks to
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the domestic money supply process).  The relative merits of fixed
versus floating exchange rates are qualitatively ambiguous and depend
on the relative magnitudes of key behavioral parameters for supply
shocks and foreign interest rate shocks.  Without going through a rather
tedious full-blown Poole-style analysis, we can still be very precise
about the case of monetary shocks.
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With a floating exchange rate, ?=0 (and, for notational simplicity,
? = 1); m = d is exogenous.  Since our semi-small open economy takes
the foreign interest rate as given and has perfect international capital
mobility (as shown by the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition in
equation (35)), credibly fixing the nominal exchange rate (setting st =
Etst+1 = 0, say) is equivalent to pegging the domestic nominal interest
rate at the level of the foreign nominal interest rate.  The endogenous
domestic money stock adjusts passively to shocks in the demand for
money through endogenous variations in the stock of international
reserves, ?, even if the stock of domestic credit, d, is exogenous.  Real
economic activity (output, real exchange rate and real interest rate) is
perfectly insulated from domestic financial shocks   So is theeR.
domestic price level.
The presumption in favour of interest rate pegging, and therefore
of fixed exchange rates, for the semi-small open economy with perfect
international capital mobility in the face of domestic financial shocks
carries over, in the multi-country version of this model (given by
equations (32) to (38) and equations (39) to (43) below), to
asymmetric financial shocks (and indeed to symmetric financial shocks
as well).  
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The particular system-wide monetary and exchange rate policy
package that is optimal from the point of view of insulating real activity
in both countries (and the two price levels!), from the effects of
monetary shocks, is system-wide nominal interest-rate targeting.  This
means a fixed nominal exchange rate, st = Etst+1 = 0 (say) (which
implies i=i*), and an adjustment of the system-wide quantity of money,
d+d*, to keep the common nominal interest rate constant at its target
level in the face of monetary shocks in either country or in both
countries.  Note that it is only the total stock of money, d+d*,  that
matters for our purposes; its decomposition into home country and
foreign country domestic credit is irrelevant.
Open-loop nominal interest targeting leads to price level
indeterminacy in the two-country version of the model under
consideration:  the real money stock required to support the target
nominal interest rate at any given levels of real output in the two
countries can be made up out of infinitely many nominal money stocks
and (fully anticipated) general price levels:  there is no nominal anchor
for the system as a whole.  The solution to this technical problem is to
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make some real exogenous variable or policy variable a function of
current, past or anticipated future values of the some  nominal price or
quantity.  An example would be to make the nominal interest rate (the
real rate of return differential between bonds and base money) a
function of the current or lagged price level, eg
It is therefore not sufficient to identify demand and supply shocks
and decompose them into idiosyncratic vs common shocks.13  Demand
shocks in turn have to be decomposed into financial (or LM) and goods
market (or IS) shocks for it to be possible to draw sensible inferences
about the appropriate exchange rate regime.  Empirical evidence (based
on credible identifying restrictions) about the relative importance of IS
vs.  LM shocks in the EU would be most welcome.
An equally serious qualification to many of the "shocking" recent
findings is that the nature and magnitude of the shocks perturbing the
system may be a function of the exchange rate regime itself, as asserted
in Proposition IV.  That is, not only do different exchange rate regimes
transmit given fundamental (real and nominal) shocks differently, but
also many different exchange rate regimes generate different kinds and
amounts of extrinsic, non-fundamental noise.  
I summarize this sub-section in another proposition.
Proposition V
Asymmetric shocks are not an argument against a fixed
exchange rate or a common currency if the shocks in
question are financial shocks and the degree of
international financial capital mobility is high.
5.  What is Required to Make Up for Loss of Exchange Rate
Flexibility?
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What is gained through exchange rate flexibility is an instrument
with strictly temporary or transitory real effects.  It facilitates
adjustment to goods market shocks and complicates adjustment to
financial shocks.  Compensating for the loss of the exchange rate
instrument therefore only requires an instrument that has strictly
temporary or transient real effects.
It is true that the word "temporary" can cover any interval of real
time from one nana-second to 20 million years.  How long is the short-
run relevant for assessing the real effects of variations in the nominal
exchange rate?  There obviously can be no answer to this question that
is universally valid; it depends on the nature of the shocks hitting the
system, on the collective institutional arrangements that have evolved
and are in place in a particular country at any given point in time and
on the decision rules adopted by private agents.  
A conventional wisdom going back at least to Milton Friedman
holds that in a low-inflation, rather closed to international trade
OECD-type economy like the US, it may take as much as two years for
monetary changes to feed through into prices rather than quantities.  If
capital formation has been affected in the mean time, real consequences
of nominal shocks may last and linger even longer than that.  For more
open economies and for economies undergoing higher and more
variable rates of inflation, the real consequences of nominal shocks
may be significantly less persistent.  The UK is probably the European
economy with the highest degree of nominal inertia, and even there it
is significantly less important than in the USA.  A good case can be
made that most of continental Europe has significant real price and cost
rigidities, but no nominal inertia of any consequence.  The loss of the
exchange rate instrument would be of no consequence if that were the
case.
The optimal currency area literature is woefully inadequate and
confused on the issue of what policy, institutional or other behavioral
changes are necessary in order to compensate for the loss of the
nominal exchange rate instrument.  The main confusions concern the
roles of international factor mobility, of international fiscal transfers
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and of divergent or convergent underlying real economic behaviour
(such as productivity growth, real earnings growth and demographic
developments).  I shall deal with them in turn.  
5.1.  Factor mobility
International factor mobility, including labour mobility may be a
wonderful thing from the point of view of adjusting to asymmetric
goods market shocks.  It is only very tangentially related, however, to
the optimal currency area argument.  The governor of the Bank of
England is a distinguished recent recruit to the ranks of those who are
deeply confused about this issue (George [1995]).  
The point is often made that the states of the US are better
candidates for a common currency area than the members of the EU,
because inter-state labour mobility is significantly higher in the US than
inter-country labour mobility in the EU (see eg Eichengreen [1990a,b],
Muet [1991, 1995], Blanchard and Katz [1992], and Mantel [1994]).
While it is correct that the US has more mobile labour than the EU, I
would argue that even the US does not have the kind and degree of
inter-state labour mobility that would be required to make up for the
loss of an independent currency.  The international factor mobility that
is required to compensate fully for the loss of the ability to vary the
nominal exchange rate, is a strictly temporary (that is, reversible)
migration.  The fact that there is little or no permanent international
migration among the EU member states is irrelevant from the point of
view of EMU, just as the fact that there is rather more permanent or
long-term inter-state labour mobility in the USA is irrelevant to the
issue as to whether or not the USA is an optimal currency area.
Permanent international factor mobility is not a substitute for nominal
exchange rate flexibility.  Temporary (that is, reversible and reversed)
international factor mobility would be a substitute for the loss of
nominal exchange rate flexibility.  Reversible, short-run labour
mobility is not an economic proposition, either in Europe or the US,
owing to the high sunk costs of physical relocation (within as well as
across national boundaries).  The kind of temporary international
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labour mobility required to compensate for the loss of monetary
autonomy is therefore not found anywhere in the world.  It is
specifically not found in the USA or in other Federal states with a
common currency.  
If the US is an optimal currency area, it therefore is one despite
the absence of the highly reversible or temporary inter-state movements
of labour that would be required to compensate for the loss of
exchange rate flexibility.  The fact that Europe not only has no
reversible, temporary international labour mobility but also has only
negligible long-term international labour mobility, does not represent
an additional binding constraint on the European capacity to
compensate for the loss of national exchange rate autonomy.  
The EU might be a richer region if artificial obstacles to
international labour mobility were eliminated, but it would be richer
regardless of the exchange rate regime.
5.2.  International fiscal transfers
What is lost by giving up nominal exchange rate flexibility can be
recouped through international fiscal transfers that are strictly
temporary or transitory (and indeed reversible (in present value terms)
if there is no Ricardian equivalence).  There is no need for any
permanent fiscal transfers to make up for the loss of national monetary
autonomy.  The fact that the EU budget is tiny and engages in a
negligible amount of international redistribution is therefore irrelevant
from the point of view of monetary union, just as the fact that the US
Federal budget is responsible for a significant amount of inter-state
redistribution (when state GDP varies) represents massive overkill from
the point of view of establishing the presumption that the US is an
optimal currency area.  Sachs and Sala-i-Martin [1992] manage to be
thoroughly confused on this issue, by failing to distinguish between
insurance against certain kinds of transitory shocks (which is all that
nominal exchange rate flexibility can provide) and permanent
redistribution through the Federal Budget (see also Eichengreen
[1990a], Van Rompuy, Abraham and Heremans [1991], von Hagen
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[1992], Courchene [1993], Goodhart and Smith [1993], Bayoumi and
Masson [1994] and Muet [1995]).  
Their confusion is shared by the Governor of the Bank of England
(see George [1995]).  All the EU needs is an international transfer
mechanism that is capable of making temporary, that is, self-liquidating
transfers between countries in order to make up for what is lost through
exchange rate flexibility.
It may well be that greater international and interregional
redistribution will be required within the EU in order to render the
system politically viable.  That, however, is a quite separate matter
from the issue of what needs to be done in order to make up for the
loss of the national exchange rate instrument.
5.3.  Divergent real developments 
In his recent Churchill lecture, the Governor of the Bank of
England also cited divergent real economic structures, behaviour and
developments 
"This longer-term problem of unemployment reflects, at
least in part, structural features of the European labour
market, which also differ from one country to another -
for example in the degree of flexibility in wages and other
conditions of employment, or in the degree of non-wage,
social costs of employment.  It is being addressed,
variously, through structural policies nationally and
through measures such as those that are being explored
by the European Commission and debated by the
European Council.  But it will not easily go away.  And it
could in fact become more difficult to resolve within
monetary union as a result of on-going differences
between member countries, for example, as a result of
differences in rates of productivity growth, or unrelated
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differences in earnings growth, or as a result of divergent
demographic trends and associated differences in
dependency ratios." 
The important and `real' (in both senses of the word) problems
referred to in the preceding quote are completely orthogonal to the
question of the desirability of monetary union in Europe, unless the
wage flexibility referred to in its first sentence were to be interpreted as
money wage flexibility.  I fear that such an interpretation would be too
charitable.
This fundamental misunderstanding of what nominal exchange
rate flexibility can deliver prompts the following proposition.
Proposition VI
Real convergence or divergence is irrelevant for monetary
union.
Asserting the contrary would mean attributing to monetary policy
(under which I include exchange rate policy) powers and significance
well beyond what it can deliver.  Does anyone really believe that the
problems of Italy's Mezzogiorno would have been alleviated if
Southern Italy had been given its own currency and had decided to
float the Southern Lira independently of the Northern Lira?  Or that
Appalachia would have been more prosperous if it had been granted its
own currency?  How would real wage rigidities be alleviated by having
an independent currency and a floating exchange rate?  How are the
competitiveness problems associated with excessive non-wage labour
costs mitigated by having a floating exchange rate?  Why would
international differences in the severity of intergenerational distribution
problems and in the strains put on public sector budgets by greying
populations and emerging "youth deficits", be any less with a floating
exchange rate than under a fixed rate?  There is no reason whatsoever
why regions characterized by persistent differences in total factor
productivity growth or by persistent differences in real earnings growth
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unrelated to productivity growth differentials cannot be locked together
in a common currency area.  No doubt real economic performance
would be dismal in a region characterized by real earnings growth
systematically in excess of productivity growth, but it would de equally
dismal with a fixed exchange rate, a floating exchange rate, or bilateral
barter.
The foregoing discussion implies that arguments such as those
made by Krugman [1992, 1993] and by Dehesa and Krugman [1993]
about increasing returns, thick market externalities, conglomeration and
the processes of regional specialization and concentration are also
irrelevant to the debate concerning the merits of monetary union.  If
money is neutral, even in the short-run, then the exchange rate regime
is obviously irrelevant.  If money is non-neutral at least in the short-
run, the hysteretic features of many of these new economic geography
models imply that transitory shocks, including monetary and exchange
rate shocks, can have permanent effects.  But so can any other
transitory shock, including the most transitory of fiscal shocks.  As
these models make it so cheap to influence the long-run course of
history, neutralizing the undesirable real effects of the absence of
nominal exchange rate flexibility (or the undesirable real effects of its
presence) would not necessarily pose a significant challenge to policy
makers.
With nominal inertia, monetary policy can influence the current
short real interest rate, that is, it can influence the short real interest
rate in the short-run.  With the myopia, herd-instinct and bandwagon
effects that tend to dominate financial markets on a day-to-day basis,
monetary policy may also have a transitory effect on the long real
interest rate, that is, it may be able to influence long rates in the short-
run (although not necessarily in a very predictable manner).  It cannot
influence either the short real rate or the long real rate in the long run.
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the ability of monetary and
exchange rate policy to influence the real exchange rate or any other
real variable14.  It is worrying that anyone in a position of influence
over monetary and exchange rate policy appears to overestimate so
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dramatically the long-run power of his instruments over the real
variables that matter.
6.  Restrictions on Capital Mobility
Virtually all the arguments given in Emerson et al [1990], to the
effect that the logic of market integration implies the need for a
common currency are seriously flawed.  Many seem to derive from
fears that competitive devaluations (increases in the nominal exchange
rate) can buy a country a lasting competitive advantage (a lasting real
devaluation), thus distorting the competitive level playing field.  These
fears are misplaced for a number of reasons.  First, even if a lasting
competitive advantage could be achieved in this manner (which it
cannot), the mercantilist obsession with competitiveness and trade
surpluses that they betray, is unhealthy and without merit.  Second,
they ignore the inflationary bias that would result from a systematic
policy of pursuing a higher real exchange rate through repeated
attempts at keeping nominal exchange rate devaluations ahead of
domestic price and cost increases, even if such a policy could be
successful (which it cannot).  Third, they ignore the historical evidence,
which supports the view that it is not possible to gain any enduring
competitive advantage by pursuing deliberately inflationary policies. 
Arguments against exchange rate flexibility based on the
complications it creates for managing the CAP (through the wedges it
drives between market exchange rates and "Green currency values") are
so far into the realm of the Nth best that it is very hard to take them
seriously.  The way out of this pseudo-difficulty would be  to abolish
the CAP, end all forms of agricultural protection and force farmers to
make a living at world prices, or choose alternative occupations.  It
makes no sense to tie the choice of currency regime to the fate of a
moribund agricultural welfare state.  
Only one aspect of market integration does indeed point in the
direction suggested by the "One market, one money" school of thought.
That aspect is financial market integration, and specifically the removal
of fiscal and administrative obstacles to the international movement of
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financial capital.  The key point here can be summarized in the
following proposition
Proposition VII
With unrestricted international mobility of financial
capital, a common currency becomes, at the very least,
extremely desirable.  In all likelihood, it becomes
unavoidable.
The arguments supporting this position are both theoretical and
empirical.  Managed exchange rate regimes, including fixed-but-flexible
exchange rate regimes such as Bretton Woods, or target zones with
hard barriers such as the original ERM, break down with probability 1
in finite time.  They are not sustainable, and therefore, except in the
short-run, infeasible.  Floating exchange rate regimes, whether they
float cleanly or dirtily, may be feasible, but will have very undesirable
operating characteristics:  they will be characterized by excess short-
term volatility and persistent medium-term misalignments.  
Take a fixed exchange rate regime as epitome of all managed
exchange rate regimes.  Any fixed exchange rate regime that is not
irrevocably fixed (that is, anything short of monetary union15) can be
abandoned for one of two reasons.  The authorities can choose to
abandon the fixed parity, for any number of virtuous or opportunistic
reasons, or they can be forced off the fixed parity by a speculative
attack that exhausts their international reserves and credit lines.  While
technically (that is, in a world with credible commitment) any solvent
government should be able to borrow infinite amounts of foreign
exchange (simply by swapping it for its own currency), in reality there
is a limit to the credit lines that any monetary authority can draw on.
Any finite limit can be challenged by private speculators in reasonably
efficient financial markets.
Even without speculative attacks, governments (including
benevolent, optimizing and competent ones) that are incapable of
credibly committing themselves to a fixed parity, may find themselves
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in suboptimal strategic interaction with the private sector (at home or
abroad) or with other governments.  Some equilibria of these games
may involve an individually rational but socially inefficient
abandonment of the fixed parity (see Obstfeld [1994], Ozkan and
Sutherland [1994] and Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti [1995]).
The gold standard survived as long as it did for two reasons.
First, the degree of international capital mobility was undoubtedly
significantly less than it is today.  Second, the key national authorities
were not held responsible for real macroeconomic performance (output
and unemployment) and could make the defense of the gold standard
their overriding priority.  At least since World War II, no government
has been able to enjoy the luxury of focusing monetary and fiscal
policy exclusively on the defense of the external value of their
currency.  Absent a lexicographic utility function with the maintenance
of the  parity in the lead position, any commitment to a fixed parity is
vulnerable, and will be tested by the markets.
It was therefore the completion of the single market programme
that sealed the fate of the EMS and the ERM, but only one component
of that programme:  the elimination of all remaining restrictions on the
intra-EC mobility of financial capital.  With all legal restrictions
removed and much of the accumulated inefficiency of the previously
protected private financial sectors swept away, a market mechanism
was created that could shift literally hundreds of billions of dollars
worth of financial claims between currencies in a matter of minutes,
and at very little cost.  Add to this a renewable population of unskilled
and unsuccessful speculators (especially those in charge of economic
policy in the national ministries of finance and Central Banks, but also
new and inexperienced players from the private sector), and all the
elements for a successful attack on a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate
arrangement like the ERM were in place.
Floating exchange rates determined in competitive financial asset
markets are likely to exhibit both excess volatility and persistent
misalignment.  Excess volatility may reflect both rational speculative
bubbles and the presence of noise-traders.  Persistent misalignment
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results from the interaction of (technically) efficient financial markets
and markets for real goods and services characterized by nominal
inertia.  It is important to realize that when we compare a common
currency regime with a multiple currency regime, we are not just
tracing how and where a given amount of fundamental noise shows up
under the two regimes.  The opening up of additional financial markets
(such as the currency markets in our case) creates the potential for
additional noise to be thrown into the system.  Markets make noise,
they don't just process it.
Is it possible to put the genie back in the bottle through fiscal or
administrative capital controls?  I don't think so.  The scope and
efficiency of the global industry ready to take on the authorities by
supplying the means to avoid and evade controls is awesome.  The
rewards from taking on the monetary authorities are too high, given the
penalties likely to be imposed and the risk of being caught evading the
controls.  If our society is unwilling to line speculators up against the
wall and shoot them after a fair trial, the odds on capital controls
working effectively are virtually nil.
Proposals for imposing non-interest-bearing reserve requirements
on balances used for taking open positions to attack currencies are
naïve because they ignore key developments of the last two decades in
the international financial markets.  There are myriad ways now of
attacking a currency:  through the spot markets, through the forward,
swap and futures markets, through currency options markets etc.
"Tobin" taxes (see eg Tobin [1982]) on foreign exchange transactions
would likewise have to be expanded in their coverage to include
transactions in the forward markets and in markets for all other kinds
of derivatives.  Note that this argument for a common currency extends
beyond the EU and applies to any countries linked by unrestricted
financial capital mobility, including the US and Japan.
7.  The Maastricht Convergence Criteria
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A common currency may be the only logical option left after the
abolition of capital controls, the question is, can we get there from
here? In particular, how do the Maastricht convergence criteria
enhance or impede the process?
Interest rates.  Long-term nominal rates of interest on government debt
are required to converge to a level close to that achieved by the three
countries with the lowest rate of inflation.  In the absence of
differential default risk, there will be complete interest rate
equalization immediately following currency unification.  The only way
to make sense of the interest rate convergence criterion, which imposes
limits on interest rate spreads prior to monetary union is that it is yet
another stratagem for keeping out of the monetary union governments
whose debt is subject to a significant default risk premium.  Barring
default risk, the criterion is redundant:  monetary union ensures interest
rate equalization.  It is not necessary to have interest rate convergence
prior to monetary union.
Exchange rate.  Exchange rates should be stable (within the normal
bands allowed for the ERM) for at least two years before EMU,
without any special measures to restricting the free flow of foreign
exchange.  While since the ERM margins were widened to 15%, it is no
longer clear what the exchange rate criterion for EMU membership
means in practice, the rationale for ruling out significant parity changes
(devaluations) prior to monetary union surely is to avoid the risk of
"endgame" devaluations aimed at achieving a transitional competitive
advantage.  
As long as monetary autonomy is expected to exist in the future,
maintaining a reputation for being tough on inflation is valuable to the
monetary authority.  The cost of losing that reputation militates against
the temptation to gain a competitive advantage (or boost output)
through devaluation.  Once monetary union is a fact, national
reputations for monetary restraint are worth nothing.  The temptation
to get in one last, big devaluation before the ECB throws the key away,
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may be hard to resist (see Froot and Rogoff [1991] and Bayoumi
[1995]).  The exchange rate criterion rules this out and therefore makes
sense from the point of view of avoiding zero-sum (at best) `endgame'
devaluations in pursuit of competitive advantage.  
`Endgame' devaluations as a means of amortizing excessive public
debt are of course also ruled out by the exchange rate criterion.  Unless
there are other feasible ways of imposing a capital levy on public debt
holders, the loss of a final devaluation as a fiscal instrument may be
costly to a number of countries for fiscal reasons.
Inflation.  Prior to being allowed to join, a prospective entrant's
inflation rate must be close to the inflation rates achieved by the three
countries with the lowest rates of inflation.  It is clear that monetary
union is a means for achieving inflation convergence.  Inflation rates for
traded goods should converge quite quickly while non-traded goods
prices and costs also would ultimately rise at a common rate (corrected
for the familiar inter-member differences in the productivity growth
differential between the traded and non-traded good sectors).  Why
then impose inflation convergence prior to monetary union as a
criterion for EMU membership? 
If there is a reasonable answer, it must involve an empirical
judgement about the inheritability of inflation  inertia following
monetary unification.  The issue is a fascinating and important one, and
one on which we have little or no empirical evidence.  Clearly, if there
is no nominal inertia, the prior inflation convergence criterion makes
no sense.  However enough in order to reach the conclusion that prior
inflation convergence is desirable, it does not suffice to note that
potential EMU members have historically been characterized by
inflation inertia.  Assume the UK has inflation inertia and the current
core inflation rate (in Sterling) is x per cent per annum.  As long as
contracts are denominated in Sterling, this core inflation rate will
respond only sluggishly to changes in economic conditions (that is the
meaning of inflation inertia).  It is by no means clear, however, what
will happen to Sterling inflation inertia once contracts are denominated
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in the new currency (say the ECU).  Will UK ECU inertia simply
inherit UK Sterling inertia or will it instead evolve  according to a
different process (say the average prior core inflation of the other EMU
members?).  We don't know.  
If there is full inheritance of inflation inertia, convergence of core
inflation rates prior to EMU is desirable to avoid important changes in
relative prices and costs building up under EMU before national core
inflation rates have converged.  It probably makes sense to be cautious,
but this is surely a judgement that can be left to the individual member
countries and does not need to be written in stone.
Public debt and deficit ceilings.  I have argued elsewhere and at
length (Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini [1993]), that while fiscal restraint
is a wonderful thing, the two numerical criteria of the Maastricht Treaty
(an upper bound on the general government financial deficit relative to
GDP of 3% and an upper bound on the stock of general government
gross financial liabilities relative to annual GDP of 60%) make no
sense.  
Fortunately, the two criteria were applied quite sensibly in the
one test case we have had thus far, that of Ireland.  Unfortunately, the
average debt-GDP ratio has continued to rise in the EU, despite an
urgent need to stimulate saving and capital formation throughout the
EU.  The purpose of the criterion (other than providing Germany with
an alibi if it decides not to give up the D-mark when the time comes) is
to strengthen the hand of the ECB vis à vis the national ministries of
finance, and the hand of the fiscally responsible countries and of
Brussels vis à vis the fiscally irresponsible countries (especially Italy,
Greece and Belgium).  It is intended to strengthen the effectiveness of
the "no bail-out" (directly by other ministries of finance or by Brussels
and indirectly by monetization through the ECB) clause by making it
less likely that a debt default contingency would ever arise or that any
country could ever blackmail the rest of the EU into servicing part of
its debt.  As long as it is applied sensibly, as it was in the Irish case, no
serious damage needs result from the pursuit of these fiscal norms.  The
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automatic fiscal stabilizers can continue to perform their normal
cyclical stabilizing functions at the national level and each government
can aim to reduce its claim on national savings in ways and at a rate
that respects differences in initial conditions, economic structures and
external environments.
Phase A.  Between the end of 1996 and July 1, 1998, the decision will
have to be taken on which countries qualify for EMU.  Stage 3,
involving the irrevocable locking of exchange rates is supposed to begin
no later than January 1, 1999.  However, the recent Green Paper of the
European Commission (Commission [1995]) suggests that it may take
up to a year between the date on which it is decided which countries
qualify for EMU and the date on which the currencies of the countries
in question are actually locked together permanently.  This so-called
Phase A seems purpose-designed to wreck the process of monetary
unification.  If it is intended to do so, its architects deserve our sincere
congratulations, otherwise it represents a monumental lapse of
judgement and design error.  The Green Paper recognizes the problem
of end-game instability (see Froot and Rogoff [1991] and Bayoumi
[1995]); "Once the date for the starting of the third stage is known,
markets would make guesses about the final conversion rates and they
would switch between possible outcomes; markets could also push
exchange rates significantly away from levels justified on the basis of
fundamentals".  The only way around this difficulty would be to
commit credibly, right from the starting date of the third stage, to the
final conversion rates.  How such credible commitment can be achieved
without formally abandoning monetary sovereignty, that is, without
subordinating national monetary authorities to a European Central
Bank, is, unfortunately, unclear.  
The practical difficulties involved in switching from national
currencies to a new common currency and the public relations problem
of selling the new currency to the people of Europe are real but not
very significant or interesting.  Fortunately it doesn't take either genius
or imagination to handle the legal problem of extending and enforcing
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contracts previously written in terms of national currencies or the
engineering problem of refitting vending machines.  The only
interesting economic and political issues concern the membership of
the group that will irrevocably fix their exchange rates, its relationship
to the EU members that are not in the group and the conduct of
monetary policy by the ECB.
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8.  Conclusion
There are no convincing economic objections left to monetary
union for most EMU members.  Even Italy and Belgium are potential
candidates, if they manage to solve their debt overhang problems and
put in place a fiscal control mechanism capable of preventing a
renewed unsustainable build-up of public debt.  Only Greece looks, at
the moment, like a rather hopeless case.  
Most economic arguments against monetary union are
misconceived, in that they overestimate what is gained by retaining
monetary sovereignty and given up by surrendering it.  The atavistic
opposition in part of the UK (the "every nation has a flag, a national
anthem, a football team and a currency" variety of political debate
favoured by political dinosaurs like Lady Thatcher) will, I think, turn
out to be of interest mainly to cultural anthropologists.  
Note that the case for a common currency made in this paper does
not depend in any way on the validity of the view that a fixed exchange
rate provides a means through which a traditionally inflation-prone
country (say the UK, France or Italy) can import anti-inflationary
credibility from a country with a strong anti-inflationary reputation
(Germany, say).  I have never understood why a nominal exchange rate
commitment short of monetary union would be more credible than the
commitment to some other nominal target, such as a domestic monetary
aggregate, the price level or nominal GDP.  Both a priori and in view
of the long history of broken exchange rate commitments, it seems
extremely unlikely that the nominal exchange rate has any unique
advantage as a nominal "focal point".  It is true that monetary union (if
it is indeed irreversible) constrains its members to have a common long-
run inflation rate for traded goods.  Whether this common rate turns
out to be the old German rate, a convex combination of the old rates
of all EMU members or something completely new is an interesting
topic for speculation.  The case for monetary union developed in this
paper goes through as long as the ECB is "within the convex hull" of
the EU member central banks.
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Just because an idea makes sense does not mean it will be
adopted.  Europe has a talent for snatching defeat from the jaws of
victory.  If the issue is decided on its economic merits, however, there
will be a common currency in Europe by the middle of the next
decade.
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1. The non-convexity intrinsic in this transactions technology means
that the value of the "technological network externalities" is not
captured by the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange markets, even
if the latter are competitive and efficient.  I elaborate on this below.
2. The only exception would be when the network-independent
benefits of using a new currency would be significantly larger than
those of each of the existing currencies.
3. The capital loss incurred on non-interest-bearing money balances
during period t as a result of the price increase between period t and
t+1 also applies to the new money issued during period t.  The base for
the tax should  therefore  be  Ht+1  rather  than  Ht.  Thus  the  inflation
tax during period t, as a fraction of period t GDP, equals
 .1
Yt
Ht%1
Pt%1
&
Ht%1
Pt
/ pt%1(1%gt%1)ht%1
4. Note that we need the growth rate of real GDP as well, and that
both actual and expected rates of inflation enter into the relationship
linking seigniorage and the inflation tax.
5. We restrict ourselves in what follows to equilibria in which the
one-period nominal interest rate is positive.  The set of such equilibria
is known to be non-empty for the model under consideration.
6. Note that real money balances, unlike the physical capital stock,
is not a predetermined state variable.  If the exogenous variables are
constant, the economy can achieve the steady state instantaneously.
7. To the extent that the Fischer hypothesis does not hold and
higher anticipated inflation reduces the real rate of interest, the real
value of the debt is eroded even by higher anticipated inflation.
8. We are talking potentially serious money. A recent Bundesbank
ENDNOTES
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study, reported in the Financial Times (Financial Times [1995]),
estimated that some 30 to 40% of the total currency circulating outside
the banking system (between DM65bn and DM90bn) was probably
abroad. The corresponding figure for the US dollar was estimated to be
between 60 and 70%.
9. which also happens to be an `outside' fiat asset. 
10. In the model under consideration, labour services (and leisure)
are of course non-traded goods, so variations in the nominal exchange
rate still work by influencing the relative price of traded and non-
traded goods.  The only other transmission channel would be the asset
revaluation effects of nominal change rate changes, including real
balance effects.
11. Semi-small because it faces a downward-sloping demand curve
for exportables, while it treats the world nominal rate of interest and
the foreign price level as parametric.
12. Alternatively, the objective could be to stabilize output around
its ex-ante full information natural level, 0.  The optimal policy
response to LM shocks and IS shocks is unaffected by this.  The
optimal policy response to supply shocks obviously would be.
13. Some of identifying restrictions commonly imposed in order to
distinguish supply from demand shocks tend to be laughable.  The
common restriction that demand shocks have no long-run real effects
only makes sense for monetary policy shocks.  It certainly does not
make sense for fiscal policy shocks.  Even the redistribution over time
(through borrowing) of the lump-sum tax financing of a given
exhaustive public spending programme will affect saving and capital
formation.  Likewise, permanent variations in exhaustive public
spending will, except in the simplest representative agent models, have
long-run real effects.  Changes in private savings behaviour brought
about by shocks to the subjective discount rates, the parameters
characterizing intertemporal substitution or the parameters
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characterizing risk aversion likewise will tend to have long-run real
effects.  It is extraordinary that the long-run effects of "IS" shocks of
this kind are simply assumed away in much recent empirical work.
14. Other than the nominal rate of interest, which is, despite its name,
a real variable.
15. It is true that even monetary union is not irreversible.  The
Maastricht Treaty does not, however, have any provisions for a country
leaving EMU after joining it.  Indeed, neither the Rome Treaty nor the
Maastricht Treaty have provisions for member states leaving any of the
European institutions to which they have acceded (pace Mr Portillo
and Lady Thatcher).
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TABLE 1
Seigniorage in the EU
Seigniorage
 as % of GDP
Average over
Annual Figures
Inflation Tax***
as % of GDP
Average over
Annual Figures
Interest Forgone
 as % of GDP
Average over
Annual Figures
 1985-
1989
 1990-
1994
 1985-
1989
 1990-
1995
 1985-
1989
 1990-
1994
UK 0.47* 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.40 0.34
Austria 0.39 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.53 0.76
Belgium 0.16 -0.07 0.30 0.21 0.62 0.58
Denmark 0.60 0.62 0.21 0.10 0.47 0.50
France 0.35 -0.24 0.24 0.12 0.52 0.43
Germany 0.67 0.56 0.21 0.34 0.42 0.73
Italy 1.56 0.86 0.98 0.92 1.77 1.81
Netherlands 0.67 0.50 0.06 0.19 0.51 0.60
Sweden 0.74 1.52 0.40 0.34 0.66 0.86
Finland 1.09 0.73 0.31 0.21 0.64 0.79
Greece 2.24 1.91 2.55 2.38 2.71 2.60
Ireland 0.53 0.20 0.37 0.07 0.93 0.89
Portugal 4.08** 2.93 2.21 2.90 2.24 2.87
Spain 1.89 -0.42 1.34 0.82 1.86 1.61
1. Source: IFS on CD Rom, International Monetary Fund, June 1995.
2. Definitions: Base Money:  Reserve money.
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Inflation:  Annual inflation in the GDP deflator, year-over-year.
Interest Rate:  TB rates except for the Netherlands, where the call money
rate is used and Finland for which the money market rate is used.
3. Notes: 1990-1994 averages.
For the Seigniorage measure, the averages are over 1990-1994 except for:
Austria, 1990-1993; Belgium, 1990-1993; Italy, 1990-1992; Greece, 1990-
1 9 9 3 ;  I r e l a n d ,  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 3 ;  P o r t u g a l ,  1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 2 .
For the Inflation Tax measure, all are 90-94 except:  Austria, 1990-1993;
Belgium, 1990-1993; Italy, 1990-1992; Greece, 1990-1993; Ireland, 1990-
1993; Portugal, 1990-1992.
For the Interest Forgone measure, all are 90-94 except:  Austria, 1990-
1993; Belgium, 1990-1993; Italy, 1990-1992; Greece, 1990-1993; Ireland,
1990-1993; Portugal, 1990-1992.
4. IFS lines corresponding to the various items:
Real GDP 99b.r 
Nominal GDP 99b.c.
Interest rates 60b or 60c
Monetary base 14
* There is a break in the UK series between 1985 and 1986.  Excluding 1986
changes the 1985-89 figure from 0.47 to 0.30.
** There is a major break in the monetary base series for Portugal between 1988 and
1989.   Excluding 1989 changes the 1985-89 figure from 4.08 to 1.92.  
*** Note that, in order to preserve comparability with the rest of the literature, the
inflation tax is calculated using the beginning-of-period money stock  rather than
the end-of-period money stock argued to be the proper measure according to this
paper.  The numerical differences turn out to be negligible.
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